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INJUNCTION-RIGHTS

OF

PRIvAOY-EN

ROEMENT

IN

EQUITY.-Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., et al., 64 N.
E. Reporter, 442 (Court of Appeals of New York, June 27,
1902). In the constant transitions and ceaseless expansion of
the law to adapt itself to the conditions of modem life, new anddefinite possibilities are continually seeking admission into the
broad area of legal conceptions. Originating in the inventive
mind of an energetic attorney or produced'by the genius of some
legal expert these theories assume form and figure and, by appearing in a series of cases, not precisely involving them or
requiring their definite acceptance or rejection, lead us to think,
sometimes erroneously enough, that they have become part and
parcel of the law itself. No case can therefore be more interesting or imlortant than one which finally presents as a definite
issue, the. validity,--or invalidlity,--of such an interloping principle and compels the court to meet it face to face for a final
determination. The invigorating stamp of the judicial sanction must then be either extended or.refused; in either event the
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result is a clearing of the legal atmosphere and a dissipation of
doubt and uncertainties.
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Company decided in the
Court of Appeals of New York during the current year, is such
a case. It was there- definitely held that in the law of New York
at least "the right of privacy," called at times "the right to be
let alone," has no place or recognition. Ever since the earliest
enunciation of this doctrine in the Harvard Law Journal in
1890 (Vol. IV) efforts had been made to incorporate it into the
body of the New York state law, but the question was never
squarely raised until presented by the present case.
It appeared from the complaint that the defendant was a
milling company engaged in the manufacture of flour and that,
having in some way secured the picture of the plaintiff, it had
without her knowledge or consent "made, printed, sold and circulated about 25,000 lithographic prints" and copies thereof for
advertising purposes. Over the photograph in every instance
were printed the words "Flour of the Family" and below was the
name of the defendant company. These posters were placed
indiscriminately in stores, saloons and other public places
throughout the neighborhood. The plaintiff alleged "that her
good name had been attacked, causing her great distress and
suffering, both in body and mind, that she had been made sick
and suffered a severe nervous shock, was confined to her bed and
had to summon a physician." She prayed therefore that the
defendants be enjoined from a further publication of her picture
and asked also for damages to the amount of $15,000. The
injunction was granted by the trial judge and the Appellate division unanimously affirmed this decision, but the Court of Appeals by a vote of four to three reversed the judgment because
in its opinion the complainant had failed to state a true cause of
action.
In view of the fact that the Court was practically adjudicating
res nova and that a vigorous minority opinion, concurred in by
two other justices, was delivered by Mr. Justice Gray, it will
be profitable to investigate the grounds upon which the court
placed its decision. After the fact had been noted that the socalled "right of privacy" had received no mention whatsoever in
the writings of the early commentators on the law, a review of
the most analogous cases resulted in the conclusion that recent
decisions had failed to give it a place in modern jurisprudence.
The court declared itself to be unwilling to assume the responsibility of making an innovation which necessitated what it felt
to be a decided departure from the common law and therefore
banishing from consideration this right of privacy it refused to
grant the relief sought because neither the common law nor
equity presented any other principle which unequivocally controlled the case.
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The question is at once suggested, What are the several grounds
upon which the Court of Equity will assume jurisdiction in such
cases? In the first place it will interpose'by injunction to preveuit a breach of a contract, express or implied. There is no
better illustration of this group of decisions than Pollardv. Photograph Company, 40 Ch. Div. 345, 1888, where the defendant
company after taking the plaintiff's picture for which, it was
duly paid, struck off a number of additional copies and proceeded
to sell them in the form of Christmas cards. The plaintiff was
granted an injunction (1) because the defendant was guilty of
a breach of the contract between the parties and (2) because the
defendant had failed to observe the relations of confidence established between the parties when the plaintiff consented to the
taking of her photograph. This last reason for the court's decision is illustrative of a second distinct, yet kindred ground, for
the granting of equitable relief. The court will always prohibit
a breach of trust or an abuse of confidence and thereby prevents
the disclosure of all trade and professional secrets whose divulgence is not essential to the public welfare. Tipping v. Clarke,
2 Hare, 383, 1843; Williams v. Assurance Co., 23 Bear. 338,
1857. As the parties in the leading case were utter strangers
to each other, unassociated by any privity of contract or. mutual
trust, the court very correctly eliminated from the discussion'
any reference to the two principles just mentioned.
The third and fundamental, sometimes asserted to be the
exclusive, ground for equitable intervention is the protection of
property rights. The suggestion at once presents itself that this
idea was seriously involved in the present case. Indeed in the
dissenting opinion a most earnest argument is advanced- for
classifying the case under this head and granting the relief
sought. It is pointed out that property is not the thing itself
which is owned so much as it is the right or bundle of rights
which the person possesses and may exercise over such things,
whether they be cortioreal or incorporeal, and so it is shown that
the right to be protected in the possession of a thing or the
enjoyment of privileges is property and as such is entitled to
protection. The legal conception of 'property rights has passed
through a gradual evolution and process 6f growth rendered necessary by the new ideas involved in modern commercial life and
the new forms invented and employed in business enterprise and
activity. Things incorporeal and intangible with the rights
carried with them have long since been recognized as constituting property of the highest value and importance:
Equity jurisprudence now contains the well-established and
almost -qniversally recognized principle that the productions of
the mind are in every sense property, and as such will be protected. Woolsy v. Judd, 4 Duer, 379, 1855; Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 2 Bush. 480, 1867.-.The writer of a letter, which may

NOTES.

lack all literary qualities and therefore be entirely free from
pecuniary value, possesses nevertheless a qualified property in the
subject matter thereof and is entitled to have shielded from
public scrutiny and criticism this humble reflection of his mental
or spiritual life. Gee 'w.Pritchard,2 Swanston 402, 1818, is the
familiar case always cited in support of this doctrine. The
property protected is not the substance upon which a communication of the author's thoughts is made, but the thoughts themselves. This truth is demonstrated in the two cases of Abernethy
v. Hutchinson, 3 Law J. Ch. (0. S.) 209, 1825, and Caird v.
Sime, 12 App. Cases, 326, 1887, where professors were allowed
to enjoin the publication of lectures which they had orally delivered and which had been written down by some hearer and prepared for general circulation. The law therefore is prepared to
protect and zealously guard for every man the verbal expressions
of his mental pictures, or in other words to assure to him complete control over these creations of his thinking powers. It is
difficult to distinguish, for purposes of property classification, the
mental pictures of a man, represented in language, and the
physical appearance of the same individual, reproduced by means
of the protographer's art. The suggestion that the former are
portrayals of the author's inherent nature and are therefore
more peculiarly and significantly his own, reflecting his knowledge and his skill in expression, carries with it no weight.
Thoughts at best are shifting, changing things, lacking frequently both exactness and permanency, and do not belong exclusively to one individual. The same idea may be shared by many.
Nor does the peculiar wording in which the thought is wrapped
constitute an element of distinction. Literary merit, as the
New York case of Woolsy v. Judd, already cited, points out, is
not essential. No matter how ungrammatical their phrasing or
unscholarly their preparation the same protection is accorded
alike to all letters. On the'other hand nature itself has decreed
that a man's face shall forever, from a physical standpoint. be
the mark of his individuality. It is distinctly and absolutely his,
-an inalienable possession which in all time shall never be
duplicated and which by the curious working of another natural
law is the faithful mirror of his inner life and character. Even
his name is not so exclusively and necessarily his own since it
may accidentally be borne by others and may be abandoned or
altered at his own option. Perhaps one entering some field of
public life impliedly consents. as suggested in Corliss v. Walker,
57 Fed. Rep. 434, 1893. to the unrestrained use of his picture
as he does under modern provisions to an investigation and free
discussion of his past history and present conduct. But if the
thoughts expressed by a private person in an ordinary letter are
to be protected on the ground that they are the peculiar property
of the author, why should not that individual be equally entitled,
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and on the same grounds, to prevent the most annoying and distressing uses of his own countenance which must ever stand to
the world at large as the index and distinguishing stamp of his
individuality? Such unbridled acts, kept by their unprincipled
perpetrators safely without the bounds of libel, must necessarily
reflect most seriously upon the character and general reputation
of the individual in question. Lord Cottenham's statement that
"a man should be protected in the exclusive use and enjoyment
of that which is exclusively his" could nowhere be literally
applied with greater appropriateness.
As a second distinction between the letter and lecture cases
and the one under discussion, it might be urged that .a man's
intellectual productions are often a source of profit to him, and
should therefore be protected. But pecuniary value has long
since been discarded as a criterion upon which the propriety of
the equitable remedy is made to depend. And even if the author
and prospective publisher of literary compositions is to be protected for the reason just suggested, the same principle applies
with equal force .to the case at hand. The face of the present
plaintiff evidently has some value. Otherwise the defendant
would not have persisted in its use. If monetary considerations
are involved, why should the benefits be conferred entirely upon
a stranger? Why should not the value of the portraiture belong
exclusively to the owner thereof until its use has been granted by
him to the public or some individual? Indeed, if the plaintiff
in this case had alleged that she fiad been offered a large sum
of money by an advertising agency for the exclusive use of her
face, as soon as she could guarantee such exclusiveness, and had
therefore prayed that the defendant be enjoined from using the
face, it is difficult to forecast the result under the present
decision which classifies the "right of a man to pass through the
world without hdving his picture published," or at least to control and regulate such publication, under the general right of
privacy and not within the limits of the legal conception of property.
Possibly a third differentiation that might be drawn between
letters and photographs is that secrecy and privacy necessarily
attach to the thoughts expressed in the former while the
face of a man is exposed every time he appears in public and
is therefore an open book which the world may read. Truly
enough it is exposed, but not in bar-rooms and similar places
nor to an extent which justifies the unlicensed spreading of likenesses thereof broadcast, and promiscuously throughoilt the country. A general control at least of the circumstances under which
appearances are to be made should certainly in all fairness lodge
in the individual who is primarily to be affected thereby.
The court having declined to recognize the defendant's offence
as being embraced in any one of the three categories already
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referred to, an attempt was then made by the plaintiff to introduce a new and fourth ground for equitable relief-protection
of the so-called right of privacy. Indeed the long opinion rendered for the majority consisted almost wholly of an answer to
this argument and inthe final analysis it amounted to a denial
of the previous existence of the right coupled with a refusal at
the present time to bring it into being. The idea that the principle involved in all these cases where equity assumed jurisdiction was not one of private property but of an inviolate personality was therefore of course rejected. The court's action was based
(1) on a failure to find precedents which would justify a different holding and (2) the probability that an acceptance of the
right proposed would lead to a vast amount of litigation for imaginary or fictitious affronts, bordering even upon the absurd. A
review of the New York authorities, which in any way approach
the subject, shows that the question was an open one until the
present judgment was rendered. In Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.
Y. 434, 1895, where the relatives of Mrs. Schuyler, then deceased, sought to restrain the defendant from erecting a bust of
that lady, relief was at first granted, the Supreme Court in three
separate opinions, admitting the existence of a right of privacy.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, but only on the
ground that a right which might under the circumstances exist
in Mrs. Schuyler did not survive to her relatives and that the
interference with the plaintiff's right of privacy was too indirect
and trivial to be considered. Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N. Y. Supp.
908, 1893, was decided before the reversal of Schuyler v. Curtis,
but, as the plaintiff was the person whose picture was about to
be published and who was granted an injunction, the reason given
later for setting aside the judgment in Schyier v. Curtis did not
apply or overrule the case. It became therefore a more or less
positive authority in favor of the existence of a right of privacy.
In the later case of Murray v. Engraving Co., 28 N. Y. Supp.
271, 1894, the court refused to enjoin the publication of a picture, but it was the picture of the plaintiff's son and not the
plaintiff himself; hence the case is distinwuishable. These citations have been given to reveal the fact that the court in finally
deciding whether or not the immunity of the individual extended
as far as the advocates of this new doctrine wished to carry it,
was called upon to settle a most interesting and perplexing question and received from existing decisions little guidance or assistance. though the drift of lega.l sentiment seemed to be slightly
opposed to the view finally adopted. Whether or not this stand
against the extension of equitable relief to prevent the commission of wrongs, which would not be actionable at common law,
is the wise prudence of judicial forethought and conservatism.
time alone shall tell. Theoretically the court is probably correct,
but it is certainly true that, aside from the non-support of the
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common law, which, of course, once admitted, is conclusive, the
one positive argument advanced to support its position, namely,
the likelihood of multitudinous and vexatious litigation, is greatly
overdrawn and magnifies the true probabilities. Facts similar
to those of the leading case would seldom be repeated, and even
then the granting of injunctions is largely discretionary with the
court and depends upon the peculiar circumstances of the individual case.
The leading queries of the case, are whether the court could
not have recognized the right infringed as a right of property
and so granted the relief without involving the doctrine of
privacy at all, or failing in this, have adimitted the legality of
the right of privacy and decided accordingly; both of these things
it refused to do. Is it then true that the law can afford no redress
in such a mortifying and distressing situation as the present
plaintiff found herself? -Incomprehensible and extraordinary
as it may sbem to the layman's mind the court itself has answered
this question in the affirmative. As its opinion suggests, the
legislature is now the only resort for citizens whose modesty and
privacy may at any time be intruded upon or who may awake
any morning to discover that their physical attractiveness or
mental superiority has brought their face before the great world
of buyers as an advertising medium. It is certainly to be hoped
that the New York legislators will not fail during the coming
session to render efficient service in this matter to their neighbors
and constituents.
A. A., Jr.
SUICIDE AS A CRIMiE-LIABILITY OF PERS N AssIsTIN .-

In

Grace v. ,State, 69 S. W. Rptr. 529 (Court of Criminal Appeals
of Texas, June, 1902) the appellant was indicted for the murder
of Mollie Lane by shooting her with a pistol. He was convicted of murder in the second degree. The prisoner had been
criminally intimate with the deceased, who, in consequence of.
her shame, unsuccessfully attempted to take her life by taking
poison. The deceased declared that, though she had not succeeded in this attempt, she would resort-to other means; that
she had made up her mind to take her life. Shortly afterwards
on the same day the appellant came in, placed his pistol on a
dresser and lay down on his-bed in the room. The deceased and
two others were present. After some conversation between the
deceased and a Miss W., one of the others present, she, the deceased, sprang up, saying she would'end it all, seized the pistol,
and immediately shot herself, dying instantly. As a matter of
fact the jury found that the appellant placed the pistol on the
dresser with the intention that the deceased should use it to take
her own life.
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The indictment was based on a statute which provided that if
any one prepare means by which a person may injure himself,
with intent that he shall thereby be injured, he shall by the use
of such indirect means become a principal. On appeal this was
very properly held toonly apply where the victim is not cognizant of the intent of the accused in preparing the means for the
destruction of his or her life. That it only applies where the
victim is the innocent agent of the person providing such means
and not where the deceased acted of his or her own volition and
with guilty knowledge.
Then the question arose as to whether the appellant was guilty
at common law and the decision of the court in this connection
is not easily reconciled with reason and sound logic. It was
held "not to be a violation of any law in Texas for a person to
take his or her own life. That so far as the law is concerned,
the suicide is innocent; therefore the party who furnishes the
means to the suicide must also be innocent of violating the law."
Judgment was reversed.
Bishop on Criminal Law, Sec. 1187, says: "The same principle which forbids one to take the life of another prohibits
equally the taking of his own life. Therefore self-murder, or
suicide, like any other )nurder, is a common law felony. But
as no penalty other than the forfeiture of goods, and of personalty
generally, which was the common law punishment, 1 Hawkins,
P. C., C. 27, Sec. 7, 8, can be inflicted on him whohas murdered
himself, and as forfeitures for crime are not practiced in our
states, this offence is practically not punishable with us. Cor.
v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356, 1816. It is the same where one kills
another and, dies; though he has committed murder, our law
cannot punish him." It is to be noted that though suicide is
not punishable it is none the less a crime; to hold otherwise
would produce some very singular consequences. Suicide is not
only a crime but it is a crime requiring an intent to kill. Take
away the intent and you have the victim acting as the innocent
agent of another, or of the instigator of the crime, and it is
murder and not suicide. Such cases would fall directly within
the Texas statute as interpreted in the case under discussion.
But if suicide is not a crime then how can you carry over the
intenf to commit suicide to other crimes actually committed?
If suicide is not unlawful as held in Grace v. State, then had the
deceased in the attempt to kill herself, killed another, she would
not have been guilty of homicide. It would have been a mere
accident.
Cor. v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 1877, is directly in point. Here
the defendant in'an attempt to kill herself accidentally killed
another, who interfered to prevent the suicide. Gray, C. J., said
the life of every human being is under the protection of the law,
and cannot be lawfully taken by himself, or by another with his
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consent, except by legal authority. By the common law of
England, suicide was considered a- crime against the laws of God
and man. That one who persuades another to kill himself and
is.present when he does so, is guilty of murder as a principal in
the second degree. Cor..v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 355, 1816. This
case was affirmed in Cor. v. Dennis, 105 Mass. 162, 1870. Thus
if two mutually agree to kill themselves together, and the means
employed to produce death take effect upon one only, the survivor is guilty of the murder of the one who dies. It was further said that it is not disputed that any person who, in doing
or attempting to do an act which is unlawful and criminal, kills
another, though not intending his or her death, is guilty of criminal homicide.
In State v. Levelle, 34 S. C. 120, 1890, it was said that in the
eye of the law self-destruction-suicide-is an offence, it is
an unlawful act, and if a man with a deadly weapon undertakes
to take his own life, he is doing an unlawful act, and if in the
commission or attempted commission of that act he takes the life
of an innocent party standing by, then, in the eye of the law, that
is murder. In 1 Russel on Crimes, 424 (third Am. ed.) it is
said: "Whenever an unlawful act, an act malum in se is done
in t!'e prosecution of a felonious intention, and death ensues,
it will be murder." Now, as suicide is an unlawful act, malum
in se, and is a felony (1 Bishop Cr. Law, Sec. 511-615) therb
can be no doubt that the proposition laid down is State v. Levelle
is correct.
It is usually held, except where modified by statute as in
Massachusetts, that the commission of mayhem on one's self, or
attempt to commit suicide, is a misdemeanor, on the ground
that one cannot consent to that which is a crime against the state.
1 Bishop Cr. Law, Sec. 259-2-U. S. v. Distillery, 8 Benedict,
473, 1876. Now if the completed act is not a crime how can the
attempt to commit it or the partial commission of it be an
offence? Yet such would be the consequence of holding that
suicide is not a crime. There does not seem to be any difficulty
in the cases in holding that suicide is an unlawful act when-it
results in some other crime and punishment is possible; therefore, the fact that it is unlawful should not be lost sight of
merely because punishment is not possible. As is pointed out
by Bishop, to hold thus would be to say that where one commits
murder and dies there is no crime because no punishment is
possible.
In Grace v. State the judge goes on and states that "there is
no evidence showing that the prisoner placed the-pistol on the
dresser for the purpose or with the intent that deceased should
use it in inflicting the fatal wound." If as was previously stated
in the same opinion, suicide is no crime, then it is certainly of
no importance to discuss intent because nothing short of actual
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use of the pistol by the appellant would have made him guilty.
The learned judge does not seem to have been entirely satisfied
with his own conclusion.
From the review of the authorities and the application of reason it can hardly be doubted that suicide is a crime at common
law, hence in the casexunder discussion it would seem that if
the prisoner intentionally assisted by furnishing means for, and
was present at the time of, the suicide, he was a principal. But
if, as was held in the latter part of the opinion, the evidence did
not support the finding of guilty intent, then, however erroneous
may have been the reasons given, the ultimate decision seems
correct.
J.B. T.

